Quality of Government is Needed to Reduce Poverty and Economic Inequality by Holmberg, Sören & Rothstein, Bo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
=
=
=
=
=
Quality of Government is Needed to Reduce Poverty and 
Economic Inequality 
 
 
Sören Holmberg 
Bo Rothstein 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2010:3=
=
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711 
SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
 
March 2010 
 
 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 by Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. All rights reserved. 
Quality of Government is Needed to  
Reduce Poverty and Economic Inequality 
Sören Holmberg 
Bo Rothstein 
QoG Working Paper Series 2010:3 
March 2010 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
While it is true that lots of people in some developing countries have been lifted out 
of poverty during the recent decade, severe poverty remains a huge problem, not least 
in Sub-Sahara Africa. Recognizing the importance of institutions for alleviating 
poverty and economic inequalities, this paper starts by asking the question “which 
institutions”. Our review of the literature indicates that representative democracy 
seems to work poorly as a cure against poverty or large-scale economic inequalities. 
Our empirical analysis shows that this holds true for poor (non-OECD) countries. The 
main empirical analysis tests the relation between measures of QoG - Quality of 
Government – (such as levels of corruption and the rule of law) and 
poverty/inequality. The empirical analysis covers both a large n-analysis and a 
comparison of two cases (Singapore and Jamaica), The main conclusion from the 
large-n empirical test is that quality of government matters for reducing absolute 
poverty among poor countries and for reducing relative economic inequalities among 
rich as well as among poor countries also after controlling for democracy. This 
conclusion if strengthened by the comparative analysis of democratic but low QoG 
Jamaica and authoritarian but high QoG Singapore. 
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Poverty and Political Institutions1 
 
In a global perspective, poverty, including extreme poverty as well as huge economic 
inequality, remains as one of the most pressing social and human issues. Recent figures from 
the World Bank show that about half the planets population has to get by on less than 2.50 US 
dollars per day. The consequences are well-known in areas such as population health 
(including infant mortality), literacy, nutrition and many other measures of human 
development. Millions of children die every year and most of them could be saved by low-
cost interventions (Doces and Sanjian 2009). While it is true that lots of people in some 
developing countries have been lifted out of poverty during the recent decade, severe poverty 
remains a huge problem, not least in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Ever since development issues became an academic speciality, battalions of researches from 
various disciplines have ventured into this problem and come up with many different kinds of 
explanations and policy recommendations. A central question in this debate has been the role 
of the state in economic development. Since the late 1990s, economists and political scientists 
alike have started to argue that dysfunctional government and social institutions play a central 
part in the story. This “institutional turn” is a clear change from many earlier theories that 
focused on the lack of things like technology, skills and infrastructure.  
 
Two prominent scholars in the field, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, have thus argued 
that factors like (the lack of) technology, skills and physical capital are just “proximate” 
causes behind the lack of economic development and extreme poverty in many countries. To 
point at factors like these borders on just a repetition of the data since it is self-evident that 
people that lack access to good technology, adequate skills and capital to make necessary 
investments will be poor. Nevertheless, the well-known economic historian Nial Ferguson 
recently stated "the lesson from economic history is very clear. Economic growth …..comes 
from technological innovation, and gains in productivity and these things come from the 
 
1 This is a jointly written paper for which the authors share responsibility. However, Holmberg is the main 
author of the section “empirics I” and Rothstein for the section “empirics II”. Many thanks to Petra Olsson and 
Marcus Samanni for excellent research assistance 
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private sector, not from the state” (Ferguson 2009). This of course begs the question why the 
technological innovations are more likely to happen in some countries than others and why 
the fruits of these innovations are so unevenly distributed in many places.  
 
From an institutional perspective, the answer to the lack of economic development in many 
countries would be that the private market will not produce technological innovations and 
gains in productivity without the right type of government and social institutions. As 
Acemoglu and Robinson argue, in order to move from proximate to fundamental causes in our 
understanding of this problem , it is necessary to ask the next question, namely “why some 
countries have less human capital, physical capital, and technology and make worse use of 
their factors and opportunities”. Following Douglass North, their answer is, by and large, 
institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, p. 28).  
 
The problem with such an answer is that while probably correct, it does not solve the problem 
since in every society there are innumerable (formal and informal) institutions. It is plausible 
that even in rich countries, some government institutions are positive for growth, some are 
negative and others have no economic impact. Moreover, it is not the case that poor countries 
lack political, social and economic institutions. On the contrary, their institutions are in many 
ways as elaborated, sophisticated and complex as those that exist in rich countries (North, 
Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Thus, it is obviously not a lack of institutions that is the problem 
for alleviating poverty, but that poor countries seem to have the wrong type of institutions. 
Here we face a challenge stated by Ross, namely that “social scientists know surprisingly little 
about what types of governments tend to improve the welfare of the poor” (Ross 2006, p. 
872).  Most of the research on systems of income redistribution have taken place in OECD 
countries were the level of poverty is trivial in a global comparative perspective.  
 
Another widely held idea has been that economic growth as such would reduce economic 
inequality. The implication from an institutional perspective is that in order to reduce 
economic inequality, one need only to care about institutions that are known to foster 
economic growth. In a report from the World Bank Research Group set out to “review the 
evidence”, the authors find two results. One is that growth rates among developing countries 
are virtually uncorrelated with changes in inequality levels. However, on average, economies 
that grow faster reduce absolute poverty much more rapidly (cf. Deaton 2005; Ferreira and 
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Ravaillion 2008). Thus, depending on the definition and measurement of poverty, economic 
growth gives two different results.  
 
 
Is Democracy a Cure Against Poverty? 
 
If one wants to come up with institutions that can alleviate extreme poverty and reduce 
economic inequality, which ones are most likely to have a positive impact? From a normative 
perspective, we would have preferred the type of institutions that make up a political system 
known as representative democracy. The spread of representative democracy is said to be one 
of humanity’s great inventions (Mandelbaum 2007; Manin 1997) and the success of 
representative democracy during the last three decades is certainly something to celebrate. 
The institutions that are needed for this political system varies but includes at a minimum  
free and fair elections, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to stand for office, 
the right to form interests groups and political parties.  These institutions would sum up to a 
state of affairs in which elections will result in a) the enactment of public policies that are 
reasonable approximations of “the will of the people” and b) a reasonable possibility of 
alternation of which political parties that control government. This theory, that we may call 
“the will of the people theory” is spelled out in the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights in the following way. 
 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures (article 21) 
 
 
As argued by Holmberg and Esaiasson (1996), Rothstein (2005) as well as Gilley (2009), the 
empirical support for the idea that “the will of the people theory” is the main source for 
creating political legitimacy is scant.  Even so, and in line with many policy makers in the 
development business, we wish that such a political system would produce policies and public 
goods that would alleviate extreme poverty and large economic inequalities in general. But 
here comes the bad news: Empirical research gives very little support for this idea. If infant 
and child mortality is taken as a proxy for the production of a public good that would benefit 
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especially poor people, Ross show that democracy has “little or no effect” on this important 
social outcome (2006, p. 860). Moreover, in a recently published article Shiffbauer concludes 
that: “most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP 
growth and democracy indexes” (2010). This non-existing relation between democracy and 
the alleviation of poverty has been known for quite a while. In a review published in 1992 of 
existing research, Przeworski concluded that, "we do not know whether democracy promotes 
economic development, hinders it, or is irrelevant to it” (Przeworski 1992). In a more elaborate 
study published eight years later, the same author concluded that type of political regime had no 
impact on total national income (Przeworski 2000).  Our review of the literature seem to indicate 
that while representative democracy may be one of humanities great inventions, it seems not 
to work a cure against poverty or large-scale economic inequalities. This is, we admit, “a hard 
pill to swallow” not only for us but also for the small army of policy makers and intellectuals 
who have put all the money on the idea that “democracy aid” to developing countries would 
be a cure against extreme poverty.  
 
But maybe it is not such a hard pill to digest. A first look at the empirical relationships shows 
a more complex relationship between democracy, poverty and economic inequality. Using 
data from The Quality of Government Institute open source data set (Teorell et al. 2009), we 
find that absolute poverty and economic equality on the one hand and different levels of 
democracy on the other hand shows positive albeit weak links when all countries are included 
in the analysis (n= 142)). The same is also true when only the thirty OECD countries are 
included. The equality measure used is the Gini index (reversed) and the absolute poverty 
measure is the proportion of people living on below 2 USD/day.2  The correlations are .20 
(Gini and Democracy, all countries), .48 (Gini and Democracy, OECD countries) and .44 (2 
USD/day and Democracy, poor developing countries). A positive link in this context means 
that high levels of democracy is related to high levels of economic equality and to low degrees 
of absolute poverty (see Figures 28, 29 and 31).   
    
However, for the non-OECD countries (which are mostly poor countries) there are no positive 
link between levels of democracy and degrees of economic equality. The correlation is .00 
 
2 The measure of democracy used is a combination of the average scores of political rights and civil liberties, 
as reported by Freedom House, and the combined autocracy and democracy scores derived from the Polity IV 
data set (Hadenius and Teorell 2005).  
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(Figure 30). Among poor countries, whether the rule is democratic or not is not related to how 
equal economic wealth is distributed. But as was indicated above, democratic rule among 
poor countries is associated with lower levels of absolute poverty. Thus, in our data, 
democratic rule is positively, but rather weakly related to the alleviation of poverty among 
poor countries. 
 
 
 
If representative democracy does not help the poor, what other institutions do? 
 
The reason why representative democracy may not produce the public goods needed to 
alleviate extreme poverty has recently been addressed by Larry Diamond, one of the most 
prominent scholars and policy intellectuals in the field of democratization studies:  
 
There is a spectre haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad 
governance—governance that serves only the interests of a narrow ruling 
elite. Governance that is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, 
and abuse of power. Governance that is not responding to the massive and 
long-deferred social agenda of reducing inequality and unemployment and 
fighting against dehumanizing poverty (Diamond 2007). 
 
If this is correct, the answer to why representative democracy is no guarantee against poverty 
or large-scale economic inequalities becomes clear. To paraphrase: “Its the output side, not 
the input side, stupid”. There are now a number of studies showing that corruption and 
inequality are closely related. Uslaner argues that it is inequality that causes corruption while 
others argue that the causality moves in the other direction, that corruption causes inequality 
(Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson 2000; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002; Uslaner 
2008). According to Chong and Calderóns cross-country study, "a better quality of the 
bureaucracy, and an improved overall quality of the institutions are very likely to reduce 
poverty” (Chong and Calderón 2000).  There are also reports showing that corruption and 
other types of low quality in government institutions (clientelism, patronage, systemic 
discrimination, lack or rule of law, low effectiveness) hurts poor people disproportionally 
(United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations 
Development Programme, and Asian Development Bank 2007).   In Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2009, findings show that poor people 
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consistently pay more bribes than other income groups to attend schools, receive medical 
services, or when they seek police assistance. There may be at least two other reasons why 
low QoG hurts poor people. One is that even people who are willing to support public policies 
that would help poor people (like funding to public schools and public health care) may be 
unwilling to do so if they have reason to suspect that their tax money will be squandered by 
corruption. Secondly, while both low income and middle class people stand to gain from 
universal social programs, middle class citizens (which usually are the swing voters) are not 
likely to support such policies if they have reason to believe that provisions will be tainted by 
corruption or clientelism. Thus, the state will neither have the money nor the political support 
for enacting such policies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) 
 
 
Empirics I: Cross-Country Statistics 
 
 
In the rest of this paper our research is not effects of democracy. Instead, it is more precise: 
What are the effects of quality of government on economic equity and poverty? We begin the 
analysis by looking at basic bivariate scatter plots between some often used quality of 
government (henceforth QoG) variables and two measures of economic equality – the Gini 
index (reversed) and Income of the poorest 20%. In some special analysis we also employ a 
third economic variable that indicates absolute levels of poverty – Proportion of population 
living on below 2 USD/day.  Again, we use the data  from the Quality of Government open 
source dataset (Teorell et al. 2009) 
 
The four chosen QoG variables are the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator, The World 
Bank’s Government Effectiveness measure, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, and the QoG Institute’s own Government Impartiality index. In theory, the 
four indicators measure different things, but in practice all of them are highly inter-related 
with correlation coefficients of about + .85 to +.90 between them. The Government 
Impartiality measure is based on expert judgments collected by the QoG Institute in some 
fifty counties around the world (Teorell 2009).   
 
The two measures of economic equality are also inter-related but on a much more modest 
level. The correlation is  +.72. However, the correlation between the two economic equality 
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variables and the absolute poverty measure (living on below 2 USD/day) is non-existant with 
correlations around zero The latter correlation is for obvious reasons only calculated among 
developing countries. In the more economically developed parts of the world hardly anyone 
lives on 2 USD/day.  
 
 In the Figure Appendix, twenty seven bivariate scatter plots with regression lines are 
highlighted with the four QoG variables run against the three economic equality/poverty 
indicators. For most of the scatter plots there are three versions – one for all relevant countries 
(usually around 120 countries), one for OECD countries only (around 30 countries), and one 
for Non-OECD countries (around 90 countries). The separate analyses among OECD and 
Non-OECD countries have been made in order to be able to study separately the relationships 
between quality of government and economic equality among rich as well as among poor 
countries. In the literature, the level of economic development is often included as a 
conditioning or intervening variable effecting degrees of economic equality. The OECD 
versus Non-OECD division of countries is employed as a crude but very instructive proxy 
variable for the level of economic development and richness. 
   
The results are summarized in five tables in the Table Appendix. All QoG variables have a 
positive bivariate relationship with the two variables measuring relative economic equality 
(Gini index reversed and Income of poorest 20%). The QoG correlates are stronger with the 
Gini index than with the variable measuring Income of the poorest 20% (see Table 1), but all 
relationships are on the positive side. In this context a positive correlation indicates that more 
of a QoG variable is associated with higher levels of economic equality. Higher quality in 
government is related to more economic equality. Countries with higher quality of 
government tend to have less economic differences between people compared to countries 
with less quality of government.  
   
Thus, the hypothesis that high quality of government is a prerequisite or a precondition for the 
creation and sustainability of a more economically equal society gets support; at least at this 
early bivariate stage before any possibly confounding variables have been introduced and 
tested. One such obvious variable that should be controlled before we can start believe in any 
sort of “causal” relationship between quality of government and economic equality is the level 
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of economic development. Is there a connection between QoG and equality among rich 
countries as well as among poor countries?  
    
The results in Table 2 give an answer. And it is a positive answer. All four QoG variables 
reveal a positive correlation with the Gini index reversed among OECD and Non-OECD 
countries. Among poor countries as well as among rich countries, efficient and non-corrupt 
government tend to more often be present in nations with higher compared to lower levels of 
economic equality. The hypothesis that QoG is related to economic equality is clearly more 
true than false no matter how economically developed a country is. However, a small caveat 
is that the other equality measure – Income of the poorest 20%  yields somewhat less 
convincing results. Its correlations with our QoG variables are all positive as expected among 
the OECD countries, but not among the Non-OECD counties. Among the poorer Non-OECD 
nations, the relationship between quality of government and Income of the poorest 20% is not 
existing. In all cases it is non-significant with correlations between -.10 and .00.  
    
We do not have any good explanation for why the variable measuring Income of the poorest 
20% does not work as the Gini index does among poor countries. The correlation between the 
two equality measures is high (+.72), but not so high that they are identical. Obviously the 
two measures can relate somewhat differently to a third variable like QoG in some 
circumstances, like among poorer Non-OECD countries. 
    
Our conclusion, however, from this slightly discomforting result is not that quality of 
government does not matter for achieving economic equality or for fighting poverty in poor 
countries. First, the results based on the analysis with the Gini equality measure supported our 
hypothesis among OECD as well as among Non-OECD countries. Second, when we re-test 
the hypothesis among Non-OECD countries substituting a measure for absolute poverty 
(proportion of population living on below 2 USD/day) for the relative equality measure 
Income of the poorest 20%, the outcome among poor developing countries is a very strong 
correlation between higher levels of QoG (government effectiveness) and lower levels of 
absolute poverty (see Table 4).  Interpreted in causal terms – quality of government is good 
for reducing poverty among poor countries. 
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Whether or not QoG as well is good for reducing absolute poverty levels among populations 
in rich countries can not be tested with these data; naturally so, since almost nobody in the 
rich world lives on less than 2 USD per day. However, that quality of government is good for 
reducing relative poverty levels among richer countries - meaning economic inequalities - is 
strongly implicated by our results for the OECD countries in Table 2. And the result is further 
underscored by a special analysis pertaining only to the rich countries in Western Europe. 
That analysis shows a clear positive relation between QoG (government impartiality) and the 
Gini equality measure as well as with the variable covering the Income of the poorest 20% 
(see Table 3). 
 
The main conclusion from this large-n empirical test is that quality of government matters for 
reducing absolute poverty among poor countries and for reducing relative economic 
inequalities among rich as well as among poor countries. That conclusion is further 
strengthened when we apply more traditional multiple regression and find that quality of 
government has an independent and significant effect on degrees of economic equality as well 
as on levels of absolute poverty after controls for levels of democracy have been introduced 
(see Table 5). The results are fragile because of the limited number of cases (between 111 and 
132 countries) and the limited variance in the democracy variable among developed countries, 
but the outcome is important anyway. Quality of government has effects on relative and 
absolute poverty levels independent of levels of democracy. Quality of government matters 
for equality and for fighting poverty even after we have taken democracy levels into 
consideration.  
 
 If - as Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) rather convincingly claim - high levels of economic 
equality are good for most things in modern societies, then one route to take to achieve a more 
equal society is through improved levels of quality of government. Government effectiveness, 
bureaucratic impartiality, rule of law and minimum levels of corruption are not the only 
medicine, but it is in all likelihood necessary and quite useful medicines.  In the long run, to 
sustain a fairly equal society with low levels of the rule of law and government effectiveness 
and high levels of bureaucratic partiality and corruption is not viable. Our prediction is that in 
a low level QoG society like that, economic equality will not emerge - and if it emerges for 
some reason, it will not survive.     
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Empirics II: The Tale of Two Countries 
 
Most of the research that have been referred to and presented so far is carried out by large-n 
statistical analyses. In order to further investigate the relation between poverty, representative 
democracy and QoG,, we will now move to the comparative-case study method. As is well-
known, this method relies heavily on the research design where the theoretical question is 
central for which countries that should be compared.  
 
Following a suggestion by Herbert Werlin (Werlin 2007), the choice has fallen on Jamaica 
and Singapore.   At first glance, Singapore and Jamaica would seem to be quite an odd couple 
to compare. The two states are today found at separate ends of most observable data regarding 
economic prosperity, social well-being, politics and (of course) location on the globe. Still, 
except for the geography, it hasn’t always been this way. Had we made the same comparison 
fifty years ago, we would have seen two, in many aspects strikingly similar, soon-to-be ex-
colonies, in the midst of making an attempt to establish themselves as independent states and 
hopefully prosperous societies. First, the countries had then about the same population, 
around 1,8 million inhabitants. Second, they were almost equally (very) poor. Third, the 
political climate was relatively healthy, compared to so many newly independent nations of 
the time that plunged into civil war as soon as the former masters returned to Europe. Fourth, 
both countries had for a long time been British colonies and independence came at about the 
same time (1962 for Jamaica; 1965 for Singapore). 
 
As argued by Werlin (2007), most social scientist who in the early 1960s would have been 
asked to predict the future development of these two relatively small new countries would 
have concluded that Jamaica stood a much better chance to foster social well-being, alleviate 
poverty and create economic prosperity than did Singapore. Compared to Singapore, Jamaica 
had (and still has) plentiful natural resources (most importantly bauxite) that were in high 
demand on the world market. It was also close to one of the world’s biggest markets for what 
its fertile agricultural sector could produce. Moreover, with its stunningly beautiful beaches 
and pleasant climate, Jamaica would have been ideal site for the development of a large 
tourist industry, especially since neighbouring Cuba had just decided to leave that market. 
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Moreover, as will be shown in more detail below, the country inherited from Britain a 
Westminister model democracy and, important in this context, a relatively honest, impartial 
and professional civil service.  
 
Singapore was in the mid 1960s clearly in a worse situation. At the time of independence, the 
country was not only destitute but lacked marketable natural resources.  It was located farther 
away from the big markets in the U.S. and Western Europe than was Jamaica. Moreover, 
Singapore was ethnically much more divided than Jamaica, and suffering from difficult racial 
and religious turmoil as a legacy from its separation from Malaysia in 1965. At independence, 
mass unemployment added to the difficulties. However, the outcome today is almost an 180 
degree turn from what could reasonably have been expected in 1965.     
 
Regarding the geographic factor, one could of course argue that South-East Asia and the 
Caribbean are two very different places in terms of culture, and which major powers that have 
dominated the regions in the past and present. Still, both regions are on many measures 
among the most internally divergent. Looking at just one example, UNDP’s index of Human 
Development,3  there seems to be little evidence that the overall culture in these two regions 
makes them particularly homogenous. The Caribbean states range from number 37th  
(Barbados) to 149 (Haiti), with Jamaica as number 100 (second from the bottom in the 
region). In South East Asia,  Singapore is placed at 23 in this global ranking, a stark contrast 
to Myanmar at number 138, as well as neighbouring Malaysia at number 664. Hence, it 
appears that a nation from either region is not, like Western Europe or sub-Saharan Africa, 
more or less bound to perform in a certain way when it comes to human development, derived 
simply from its physical location. 
 
Comparing economic and social performance 
 
Since independence, GDP per capita for Singapore has grown more than six times, which by 
most comparable standards must be seen as an incredible feat. Singapore is now (2009) richer 
 
3 United Nations Development Program 2009. Human development report 2009:  
overcoming barriers – human mobility and development 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf (nov. 6th 2009) 
 
4 Ibid. p. 143ff. 
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than all former colonial powers and has a GPD/capita that is higher than the United States, 
Switzerland, and all countries in the European Union except Luxembourg and Norway. In 
comparison, Jamaica has shown a more modest 25 % increase in economic growh, which all 
occurred during the first ten years of independence. In fact, Jamaican (real) GDP per capita in 
2008 was less than it was in 1972. 
 
Figure 32. Development of GDP/capita for Jamaica and Singapore 1962-2008 
 
 
 
Sources:  QoG time-series data (June 17, 2009):   
 
 
When it comes to social well-being, measured as population health, the differences between 
the countries are, as shown be the table below, staggering. WHO statistics from 2006 show 
that infant mortality - the probability of dying by the age of 5 per 1000 live births - is eight 
times higher in Jamaica compared to Singapore. While the level of infant mortality has 
remained consistently high in Jamaica since 1990, Singapore has, during the same period, 
managed to cut its rate by more than half and now has one of the lowest levels of infant 
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mortality in the world. It may be added that when infant mortality is counted as probability of 
dying during the first year, the difference between the countries is considerably smaller (five 
to one), showing that the risk of dying increases for Jamaican children when they are between 
their first and fifth birthday compared to their first year of life. While overall life expectancy 
according the WHO statistics does not differ more than eight years (Jamaica 73,5, Singapore 
82), if broken down by gender and age group, the differences become substantial.  
 
Table 6. Adult mortality rate between 15 to 60 years per 1000 population for men 
 
Country/year 1990 2000 2006 
Jamaica 175 182 224 
Singapore 152 97 83 
    
Source: WHO Statistics 2006 
 
As the figures show, a male Jamaican between 15 and 60 years of age has a mortality rate that 
is three times higher than for a Singaporean male. Moreover, this difference has increased 
dramatically since 1990 as the mortality rate in Jamaica for men in this age group has gone up 
while for Singapore, the mortality rate for this group has almost been cut in half. One reason 
behind this huge difference may be related to the risk of death by criminal violence. Jamaica 
has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Although the data should be treated with 
some care, the figure from 2006 is 49 per 100.000 inhabitants, more than twice the rate for the 
countries in the Carribean region. Moreover, Jamaica’s homicide rate has more than doubled 
since the early 1980s and has increased five times since 1972. Singapore on the other hand 
has one of the lowest homicide rates in the world, 0.48 per 100.000 inhabitants.5  Thus, the 
chance of dying from criminal activity is almost exactly 100 times higher in Jamaica than in 
Singapore.  According to a report jointly issued by the United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime and the World Bank, Jamaica if it could reduce its homicide rate to the level of Costa 
Rica, the country would increase its economic growth by 5,4 percent annually.6   Jamaica also 
has one of the highest rape rates in the world. The impact according to the report cited above 
 
5 Data for Singapore from Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 26, no. 6. Data for Jamaica and the 
Carribean region from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Report No. 37820 (March 
2007), “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean”.  
6 Ibid, p. 10. 
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is that “due to the high levels of violence in parts of urban Jamaica, residents are afraid to 
leave the homes and interact less often with friends and family who live elsewhere”7 (ibid. p. 
15). In the capital, Kingston, one study reports that in the early 1990s, 17 percent of 13 and 
14year-olds had been raped or been victims of attempted rape.8  A survey carried out by the 
World Bank in Jamaica showed that 39 percent of business managers responded that they 
were unlikely to expand their businesses because of the crime level.9   It should come as no 
surprise that this level of violent crime is likely to have an impact also on social trust among 
Jamaicans and on the possibility to build a thriving tourist industry. Two surveys, one from 
2006 and one from 2008 show that Jamaicans are one of the least trusting people in the world 
with only 14 to 15  percent stating that they believe that “most people can be trusted”  while 
about 85 percent concur with the statement that “one can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people”   (Lyday, O'Donnell, and Munroe 2008; Powell and Lewis 2009). Popular guidebooks 
issue stern warnings about public safety on Jamaica, especially in Kingston and more 
generally outside the gated and heavily guarded tourist resorts. And to cite the advice from 
“Lonely Planet’s Guidebook for Jamaica”: “Many local police are members of the 
communities they serve and cannot always be trusted to be impartial.” 
 
Entering Democracy 
Apart from the staggeringly divergent economic and human development between the two 
states since independence, their political histories are also quite the opposite. This will be 
developed further below, but according to Freedom House’s annual democracy rating Jamaica 
is a democracy, as it has been since the organization started to measure this. In contrast, 
Singapore is not considered a democracy by Freedom House and has not been democratic 
since independence. In fact, Jamaica scores as a reasonable well functioning democracy in 
most measures that are used when democracy is rated. For example, in The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy from 2007, Jamaica scores an impressive 9,17 (out of 
a maximum of 10.0) for “electoral process and pluralism,” which is at the same level as 
countries like Canada and Japan, and slightly higher than for the United States and Mexico. 
The measure captures issues like “are the elections for the national legislature and head of 
government free?”, “are municipal elections both free and fair?” and “do opposition parties 
 
7 Ibid. p. vi. 
8 Ibid. p. 13 
9 Ibid. p. vi 
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have a realistic prospect of achieving government”. According to Freedom House’s overall 
score from 2008, Jamaica is deemed a “free” country. Regarding press freedom, Collier 
(2009, p. 141f) reports that Jamaica has since long been ranked as one of the top countries in 
the world. The country scores an impressive “12” for the democratic quality of its electoral 
process which is the top score. For Singapore, the score is a meager 4.  For political pluralism 
and participation the score for Jamaica is an equally impressive 14, matching Mexico and 
Brazil while on this item Singapore’s score is 6, placing the country at the about same level as 
Morocco, Jordan, Cambodia and Afghanistan.   
 
There has been a long debate on how to define and measure democracy. According to one 
definition suggested by Przeworski et. al. (2000) a democracy is “a regime in which those 
who govern are selected through contested elections,” where “contested“ is defined as the 
presence of “an opposition that has some chance of winning office”. Obviously, according to 
this definition, Jamaica is a democracy. Teorell (2010) has convincingly criticized this and 
other dichotomous (or absolute) measures of democracy and has instead argued for a graded 
definition and measurement strategy. The graded measure of democracy he (together with 
Hadenius) has constructed is based on the average scores of political rights and civil liberties, 
as reported by Freedom House, and the combined autocracy and democracy scores derived 
from the Polity IV data set (Hadenius and Teorell 2005).  This index ranges from 0 to 10 
where 10 is most democratic. The estimation made by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) is that 
countries above 7.5 on this scale should count as democratic. The most recent score for 
Jamaica on this index is 7.7 while for Singapore it is only 4.4.10   Thus, even in this more fine-
grained measure, Jamaica passes the threshold for deserving to be called a democracy.  
 
To summarize, whichever democracy measure that is used, Singapore fares much worse than 
Jamaica and is regularly defined as a non-democracy. However, in the standard measures used 
to capture QoG, Singapore scores very high, usually among the top five countries in the 
world. Although not a democracy, Singapore is one of the least corrupt, most rule of law 
following countries in the world with a very high score also on “government effectiveness”.  
 
 
10 This score is from 2008 and taken from the QoG dataset, see   
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Obviously, when it comes to economic prosperity, alleviation of poverty and standard 
measures of population health, hopes that electoral-representative democracy would produce a 
good outcome for the social well-being of the population have, at least in this comparison, not 
been fulfilled. However, although causality is (as always) a complicated matter, high QoG 
Singapore has in these terms an impressive record in economic growth and in alleviating 
poverty. Although a fairly economically unequal country (Gini stands at 48,1), it is less 
unequal than Jamaica (Gini at 59, 8). How can this, for many (including this authors) 
unexpected, undesired and unwelcome non-existent relation between democracy and good 
social and economic outcomes be accounted for?  
 
Jamaica: A Democracy that Implodes 
 
Since independence, Jamaican politics has been completely dominated by two competing 
parties, the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) and the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP). The two 
parties were switching power with quite regular 10-year intervals from the 50s to the 80s, and 
after that somewhat more irregularly. While the PNP has had a more leftist orientation 
(especially during the 1970s) and the JLP has been more (neo)liberal (at least in the 1980s), 
these differences are no longer significant, and in most aspects, ideology has never been the 
driving force in the competition between the parties (Collier 2006, p. 9). 
 
Going back in time, traditional left-right ideology once did play a role in Jamaican politics. 
Following racial riots in 1938 the working-class gained a political awakening and was 
mobilized as a distinct political force (Edie 1992, p. 65ff). Around the outbreak of WWII, 
cousins John Bustamante and Norman Manley (both from the middle class), respectively 
founded the JLP and the PNP, and together they and their parties would carry Jamaica into 
sovereign statehood (Collier 2006, p. 125). At independence in 1962 Jamaica appeared as a 
relatively stable democracy in the making, having taken great steps away from the shackles of 
the old plantation society. Collier (2006, p. 126) argues that by the 1950s, 
 
 the professionalized British Colonial Office had reduced corruption to 
only a minor problem. Jamaica began its first years as a sovereign state 
with a Jamaican-born civil service that inherited strong values of honesty 
and probity from its former British colonizers (2006, p. 126) 
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The two principal political leaders, Bustamante and Manley, had reputations of strong British 
democratic values – especially the need for consensus politics – and were considered 
upstanding politicians with the interests of the Jamaican people as their central concerns. 
(Collier 2006, p. 126) Collier also argues that the two political leaders had strong democratic 
values and also an understanding of the need for consensus politics. During the first decade 
after independence, a positive trend was accompanied by increasing economic prosperity. 
However, when Norman Manley’s son, Michael assumed power in 1972, it was the start of a 
shift in the relationship between the two parties, as the new Manley regime in an “act of 
political revenge” (ibid., p. 127) commissioned an inquiry regarding corrupt practices of the 
previous JLP government. While the report indeed revealed mismanagement, Manley Jr. did 
not bother taking legal action, but rather used his political power to strengthen his hold of the 
state machinery. This eventually climaxed in the state of emergency of 1976-77, when, under 
the pretense of quelling political gang violence, Manley imprisoned many key members of the 
opposition, while embarking on a short-lived and failed attempt to socialize the economy. In 
this increasingly polarized and violent political landscape, politically affiliated gangs and 
organized crime was allowed to flourish, political murders increased, and poor inner city 
communities became impenetrable ‘garrisons’ for the two different parties, a phenomenon 
that has survived until today. Supporters of one of the political parties usually avoid going 
into areas in Kingston that is dominated by the other party (Harriot 2008, p. 61-62). It may be 
added that it is from this point in time, the mid-1970s, that Jamaica’s economy stops growing.  
 
Following the JLP resuming power under Edward Seaga in 1982, the political violence 
between the JLP and PNP continued. In this highly ranked democracy, hundreds of politically 
motivated murders occur every year, “with the numbers peaking each election year” (Collier 
2006, p. 129). Although the violence has declined somewhat since the late 1990s, violent acts 
spurred by political motives is still commonplace (Collier 2006, p. 129, Wirley 2003, p. 335-
336). 
 
Tied into this political polarization, the two parties have shown no scruples using the civil 
service to attain their own goals. As stated by Edie: “In contrast to Weber’s rational, impartial 
model of bureaucratic conduct, all relationships are highly personalized and politicized, even 
those related to the most trivial administrative procedure” (Edie 1992, p. 65). For ordinary 
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Jamaicans, the situation from the 1970s and onward rapidly started to remind of the situation 
before 1938, as patron-client-relations yet again became the main modus operandi for getting 
things done in society. An intricate clientelistic system has developed between Members of 
Parliament, civil servants, political brokers and various local criminal or semi-criminal 
“councilors”, in which citizens exchange their political support for various personalized 
favors (ibid. p 17). Civil society in Jamaica is indeed strong but not really a factor that creates 
social bridges and trust between the various factions.  
 
These structures have now set root in the fabric of Jamaican society, and the 
Bustamante/Manley Sr.-era now seems like a historic parenthesis. According to most authors, 
political violence and corruption has arrested the development of the country, but also made 
the situation somewhat stable and self-sustaining, as neither party has been able to gain a 
permanently upper hand (Lyday, O'Donnell, and Munroe 2008). Clientelism has become the 
glue that keeps the, albeit fragile, system together (Johnson and Soeters 2008; Lyday, 
O'Donnell, and Munroe 2008). Werlin notes that the state indeed has maintained its vigorous 
Westminster style two-party system. However, he adds that: 
 
both political parties regularly employ criminal gangs (assisted to some 
extent by police and civil servants) to mobilize political support, 
distribute favors, and intimidate opposition (Werlin 2003, p. 335). 
 
The result is that citizens have lost confidence in the public administration and the legal 
institutions. Inadequate pay in the public corpses is said to be supplemented by income from 
criminal activity, mostly related to drugs (Lyday, O'Donnell, and Munroe 2008). Harriot also 
focuses his analysis of Jamaica’s problems on the violent and criminal nature of Jamaican 
politics: 
 
The successful use of both violence and corruption for political purposes is 
made possible by corrupt networks that extend into the state bureaucracy. 
These methods encourage party permeation of the state and undermine good 
governance. The process is made easy by weak state institutions that are not 
very resistant to party permeation (Harriot 2008, p. 9) 
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In the recent measures of level of corruption published by Transparency International, 
Jamaica has dropped quite dramatically from place 61 in 2006 to place 84 in 2007 and further 
down to place 99 in 2009. A recent report to the United States Agency for International 
Development concludes that corruption has been allowed “to infect politics and economics to 
such an extent that it now threatens the viability of both state and society” (Lyday, O'Donnell, 
and Munroe 2008, p 5.). Another recent large scale survey project comparing 22 Latin 
American countries found that in Jamaica, “citizens’ perception that corruption is widespread 
in the public sphere is exceptionally high in absolute as well as in comparative terms”. 
Moreover, this study also found that Jamaica is “the country with the highest level of citizens’ 
lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials in the Region”. (Powell 
and Lewis 2009, p. xxiii).   
 
To summarize what the available research says about Jamaica since independence: A 
relatively stable, peaceful and “good natured” democracy in a country with natural, 
institutional and human resources that should have pointed it towards economic success 
started to go astray in the 1970s. The escalating confrontations between the two parties drove 
Jamaica into a vicious circle of corruption, favoritism, clientelism and organized crime. The 
Jamaican case shows that in developing countries, unchecked democratic competition can 
destroy a civil service and a law enforcement-sector of relatively high quality by politicizing 
it for clientelistic purposes. While the country has many of the features that result in high 
scores on measures of democracy, applied by various international organizations (regular and 
free elections, a free media, alternation of party in government, etc.), all these measures are on 
the input side of the system and relates to how democratic the access to power is. Measures 
about the exercise of power reveal a dramatically different and less encouraging picture, as do 
most measures of social well-being and poverty. 
  
 
Singapore: Autocracy goes QoG 
 
In contrast to Jamaica, Singapore is, by usually applied measures and standards, clearly an 
undemocratic country (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). However, the country boasts some 
curious and unusual traits for an autocracy, such as a well run and uncorrupt civil service, a 
high degree of rule of law, as well as government effectiveness. According to these measures, 
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Singapore’s scores are among the top five in the world. While elections are formally free and 
regular, the rulings party’s complete dominance over institutions and society in general make 
a shift in power all but impossible. At the last election held in 2006, the governing party won 
82 out of 84 seats in Parliament.  
 
Lee Kuan Yew, the country’s leader from independence to 1991 (when he became ‘senior 
minister’; currently he holds the position as ‘minister mentor’) has also been a somewhat 
different autocratic leader compared to most other long-sitting dictators. He has never built 
his authority on personalistic ties or pretended to be a charismatic leader, to use a Weberian 
terminology. In contrast to many other autocratic countries, Singapore has no traits of a 
personality cult (Mauzy & Milne 2002, p. 6). This does not mean that the top political 
leadership has taken a back seat. The Singaporean state is, for all intensive purposes, the state 
of the ruling political party (the People’s Action Party, PAP), and the PAP has for the last 
fifty years been heavily dependent of Lee Kuan Yew. Since 2004, his son, Lee Hsien Loong, 
is the Prime Minister.  
 
With its focus on, and pride taken in, meritocracy, Singapore is a highly elitist state. This has 
been a founding principle for the PAP version of the state ever since its inception during the 
1950s and 60s. The system can be described as a combination of elitism and managerialism. 
Recruitment to top positions in the party and state bureaucracy is not geared towards 
rewarding people according to the patron-client logic. Instead, meritocracy has been the 
central factor, leading to recruitment of top university graduates to the party-state system and 
such positions have been highly attractive, not least because of high salaries (Trocki 2006, p. 
130, Mauzy and Milne 2002, p. 7). 
 
In tandem with the strong emphasis on meritocracy, anti-corruption is also something central 
to both Lee Kuan Yew’s, and the Singaporean state ideology in general. This seems to have 
come from the top. According to two observers, Lee Kuan Yew’s views about corruption and 
bribery have been very strong:  
 
He is appalled by some third world leaders’ acquisition on a vast scale of 
wealth for their families and themselves. He has called this the ‘bane’ of 
the Third World, and examples in the region abound, former Presidents 
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Marcos and Suharto being among the most notorious. (Mauzy and Milne 
2002, p. 7). 
 
However, it should be noted that “clean government” has not always been the order of the day 
in Singapore. On the contrary, until the 1960s, corruption was deeply rooted in the 
Singaporean society and organized crime had a clear impact on business and people’s lives 
(Quah 2001). It seems to have been the determined action from PAP leader Lee Kuan Yew 
and his entourage to try to break this system, a policy that started in the 1960s.  As 
summarized by Uslaner (2007, p. 204), Singapore “battled corruption largely through political 
will and strong leadership”. In a comparative perspective, Singapore’s success story in 
combating corruption is, together with the Hong Kong case, as dramatic as it is rare. 
 
It should be added that Singapore is far away from the neo-liberal dream of a minimalist state 
that refrains from intervening in business or taking an active part in ensuring social well-being 
among its citizens. In these regards, Singapore under PAP can best be described as a 
developmental state that has played a very active role in both the development of the economy 
and in ensuring social well-fare among its population, not least when it comes to housing 
(Kwon 2009; Lee 2006; Root 1996).  
 
Civil society and voluntary organizations have not been well-thought of by the PAP regime. 
Its strictly elitist and meritocratic view of politics and the state has given little room for such a 
sector which by this political regime is understood as supporting political factions. As one 
observer notes: “The main political project of the period between 1959 and 1975, and 
thereafter, has been the elimination of all forms of civil society” (Trocki 2006, p.131). (Trocki 
2006, p. 131) Interest groups, which are central actors in the framework of western liberal 
democracies, has in Singapore been something of a “bad word” (Sikorski 1996, p 825).  
 
One could argue that the success in creating high QoG in Singapore would be related to 
historically inherited cultural values. Such a proposition, however, flies in the face of the fact 
that Singapore’s governance and economic situation appears quite unique when grouped 
together with any other state in the region. Looking at the whole South-East Asian region, 
there is, though most nations have experienced great growth over the last decades, little 
homogeneity, regarding wealth, democracy and government effectiveness. 
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Which Political Institutions Are Important for Reducing Poverty and Economic 
Inequality? 
 
We started this paper by referring to theories stating that institutions are important for 
economic growth and social development. The problem we pointed at was that we need to 
know which institutions? Unlike in the developed world, the link between democracy, on the 
one hand, and economic growth and social well-being on the other, is evidently not easily 
seen in neither large-n cross country studies nor when we compare democratic Jamaica with 
authoritarian Singapore. As reported above, a lengthy discussion has taken place in political 
economy about the issue of whether democracy promotes economic growth and social well-
being (cf.Charron and Lapuente 2010). Most of this discussion has been based on cross-
country large-n analyses. The two cases analyzed in this chapter provide a clear answer to this 
issue, namely that electoral representative democracy, as such, does not guarantee good social 
outcomes or works as a cure against poverty or economic inequality. Instead, these two cases 
as well as the large-n statistics we have presented give strong support to the existence of a 
causal relation between (various measures of) QoG, economic equality and reduction of 
poverty. This is certain to spill over to general social well-being.  For example, if population 
health should be the main indicator for what should count as a “successful society,” as argued 
by Lamont and Hall (2009), high QoG is clearly more important than representative 
democracy. To recapitulate Larry Diamond’s (2007) warning: Democratization, while 
globally a huge success story, is haunted by a ghost named “bad governance”. If the 
democratic process becomes entangled in clientelism, corruption and similar practices, 
democracy will not improve the social well-being of the population. It would have been great 
if all good things went together, but this is obviously not the case. The stark optimism 
concerning the role that democratization can have in alleviating poverty in many developing 
countries that many international aid organizations embrace seems unfortunately unfounded 
in the same way as the hope that civil society organizations in general have a positive impact.     
 
What accounts for the exceptional development of Singapore can certainly be debated at 
length. Many observers have pointed toward the importance of the policies against corruption 
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and clientelism launched by Lee Kuan Yew. To present such an idiosyncratic explanation is 
probably not very helpful from a policy perspective. Moreover, this type of explanation does 
not really count in the social sciences. Yet, even scholars who work with econometric formal 
models and use advanced statistical analyses in order to come up with nomothetic “covering 
laws” type of explanations in this area, have been seen to fall back to this type of “the 
exceptional individual” type of explanations. A case in point is the explanation for 
Botswana’s remarkable success in building a relatively uncorrupt and non-clientilistic state 
while managing economic growth at a considerable pace, which (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2003, p. 78) explain in part by referring to “a number of important and farsighted 
decisions by the post-independence political leaders, in particular Seretse Khama and Quett 
Masire”. This may very well be true, but then one has to come up with an explanation for why 
this type of farsighted political leadership seem so rare, as illustrated not least by the petty 
struggle for political power in Jamaica.  
 
As for the latter case, it should be noted that we often think that corruption is coming from 
forces outside as a threat to a democratic system, for example from big multinational 
companies that want access to natural resources or big contracts, ethnic groups that strive for 
political primacy or revanchist nationalistic groups that want to remedy military defeats.  
However, from reading the literature about Jamaica, a more disturbing picture comes about, 
namely that this seems to be a case where a semi-stable, reasonably successful and 
functioning democracy starts to melt down and then implodes from within. In contrast to what 
is labelled “state capture”, Jamaica is a case where corruption has its base in the public, not 
the private, sector (Johnson and Soeters 2008; Lyday, O'Donnell, and Munroe 2008).  
 
What goes on in the mind of political leaders, and what motivates their behaviour is certainly 
a tricky question to answer, especially if the ambition is to present a general explanation for 
this type of processes. Another explanation for cases of successful building of high QoG, like 
in contemporary Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana as well as in 19th century Denmark 
and Sweden, would be that these are all relatively (or very) small states that underwent great 
transitions during a period of severe external threat. There are reasonably good theoretical 
arguments and empirical support for claiming that external threats foster group solidarity. It is 
not too fanciful to imagine that leaders like the ones mentioned above could use such an 
external threat to convince various factions in their respective societies of the importance and 
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necessity to make the complicated and difficult move from inept to efficient government 
institutions.   
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Table 1: The Relationship Between Quality of Government Indicators and Economic 
Equality and Poverty (r) 
 
 
 
Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness Corruption 
Government 
Impartiality 
 r n r n r n r n 
Effect of the 
QoG Variables 
Economic Equality:  
Gini Index Reversed +.48 132 +.45 132 +.42 131 +.47 51 Positive 
Poverty: Income of 
Poorest 20% +.27 112 +.26 112 +.23 112 +.12 47 Positive 
 
Comments: The four QoG variables are highly intercorrelated; about +.85 to +.90. Their 
separate effects on the equality and poverty variables are always the same (=positive). A 
positive effect means that higher values on the QoG variables (=more quality) are linked to 
more economic equality and less relative poverty among the poorest 20 percent. The 
government impartiality variable is based on expert judgements collected by the QoG Institute 
in some fifty nations.  See Teorell 2009. n = number of countries. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlates of Four Interrelated QoG Variables with Economic Equality and 
Poverty Among OECD and Non-OECD Countries (r) 
 
 
 Rule of Law 
Government 
Effectiveness Corruption 
Government 
Impartiality 
 OECD ~OECD OECD ~OECD OECD ~OECD OECD ~OECD 
Economic Equality:  
Gini Index Reversed +.46 +.20 +.41 +.14 +.28 +.14 +.32 +.46 
Poverty: Income of Poorest 
20% +.36 -.00 +.33 -.10 +.17 -.10 +.24 ±.00 
 
Comments: See Table 1. The number of OECD countries is about 30 for the analyses with the 
three first-mentioned QoG variables and 29 for the analysis involving the government 
impartiality variable. The number of Non-OECD countries is about 100 in the three first-
mentioned analyses and 22 in the analysis with the impartiality variable. A positive 
correlation means that higher QoG values are related to more economic equality and less 
relative poverty. The three non-significant negative correlations for the poverty variable in the 
Non-OECD countries indicate that higher QoG values are associated with more relative 
poverty. However, the non-significant relationships should be interpreted as non-existent 
rather than negative.  
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Table 3: The Relation Between Government Impartiality and Economic Equality and 
Poverty Among Western European Countries (r) 
 
 Government Impartiality 
 r n 
Economic Equality:  
Gini Index Reversed +.39 17 
Poverty: Income of 
poorest 20% +.61 16 
 
Comments: The government impartiality variable is based on expert judgements collected by 
the QoG Institute in 17 Western European countries (and in 34 Non-Western European 
countries).  
 
 
 
Table 4: The Relationship Between Government Effectiveness and Poverty Among 
Developing Countries (r) 
 
 Government Effectiveness 
 r n 
Poverty: Proportion of 
Population Below 2 
USD/Day (%) -0.62 112 
 
Comments: Observe that the poverty measure in this table is an “absolute” one, not a relative 
poverty measure like in the previous tables. The analysis pertains only to some 100 “poor” 
developing countries. The negative correlation indicates that higher levels of Government 
Effectiveness are associated with lower levels of absolute poverty.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Regressing Economic Equality and Absolute Poverty on Government 
Effectiveness and Levels of Democracy (regr. coeff.)  
 
 
Gini Index 
Reversed 
Income of 
Poorest 20% 
Prop. Of Popul. Below 2 
USD/Day 
 regr. coeff. std. err. regr. coeff. std. err. regr. coeff. std. err. 
QoG / Government Effectiveness 5.39*** .99 .95*** .26 -25.91*** 4.18 
Levels of Democracy -.64* .36 -.25*** .09 -1.60 .99 
Constant 63.37*** 2.54 8.05*** .64 41.99*** 7.45 
       
Number of Countries 132  112  111  
Adj. R-squared .21  .10  .39  
 
Comments: p>/t/=.01***; =.05**; =.10*. The positive regression coefficient for the QoG 
variable when the Gini Index Reversed and Income of Poorest 20% are the dependent 
variables means that higher values of QoG are related to more economic equality. The 
negative coefficients for the Democracy variable indicate that higher levels of Democracy are 
associated with less economic equality. When Proportion of Population Living on Below 2 
USD/Day is the dependent variable the negative coefficients for the QoG variable as well as 
for the Democracy variable mean that higher values of QoG and of Democracy are connected 
with lower levels of absolute poverty. The latter analysis only involves ‘poor’ developing 
countries.  
 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.18
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Transparency International (2002)
Economic Equality vs. Corruption
Figure 1
Bangladesh
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Colombia South Africa
Uruguay
Chile
USA
Israel
Singapore
Denmark
Finland
United KingdomEstonia
Germany
Austria SwedenFrance
SloveniaHungary
Czech Republic
Ethiopia
ChinaMorocco
Low High
High 
Equality
Low
Equality
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.24
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
Economic Equality vs. Rule of Law
Figure 2
Somalia
Haiti
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Turkmenistan Macedonia
Slovakia Hungary France
Thailand
India
USA
Chile
Denmark
UruguayGuyanaUganda
Yemen Guinea
Bangladesh
Venezuela
Mexico
Argentina
Israel
Sweden
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
HighLow
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.20
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
Economic Equality vs. Government Effectiveness
Figure 3
Iraq
Haiti Kenya
Zimbabwe
Mexico
Chile
USA Singapore
Denmark
SwedenFrance
Slovenia
Slovakia
Israel
Thailand
TurkeyGuyanaVenezuela
Turkmenistan
Ethiopia
Egypt
Macedonia
Mongolia
IranUzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Haiti
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.22
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Economic Equality vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 4
USA
Brazil
Mexico
South Africa
Bosnia & Herz.
Macedonia
Slovenia
Hungary
Uzbekistan
Poland
Germany
France Sweden
Estonia
Finland
Denmark
New Zeeland
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.05
Sources: UNDP(1995-2003), Transparency International (2002)
Income of Poorest 20% vs. Corruption
Figure 5
Bolivia
Ecuador
Brazil
Peru
Lesotho
Uruguay
Italy
ChinaPapua New Guinea
Mongolia
Chile
USA
United KingdomNew Zealand
Singapore
Denmark
Sweden
FinlandNorway
Switzerland
Germany
France
Hungary
Korea
Czech Republic
Bangladesh
IndonesiaRomania
IndiaUzbekistan
Benin
Mozambique
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.07
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
Income of Poorest 20% vs. Government Effectiveness
Figure 6
Haiti
Chile
USA
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Sweden
Finland
France
South Korea
Poland
Hungary
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Burundi
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Pakistan
Romania
Haiti
Turkey
China Uruguay
Ecuador
Papua New Guinea
Brazil
Iran
Uganda
LesothoLow
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.07
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
Income of Poorest 20% vs. Rule of Law
Figure 7
Haiti
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
USA
Chile
Israel
Uruguay
LesothoBolivia
Brazil
Paraguay
Czech Republic
Zimbabwe
Uzbekistan
Indonesia
Yemen
Armenia
Romania
Hungary
South Korea
France
Papua New Guinea
Mozambique
Phillipines Turkey
Morocco
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-2 -1 0 1 2
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.01
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Income of Poorest 20%  vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 8
Czech Republic
Hungary
Germany
Sweden
Norway
New ZealandUnited Kingdom
Switzerland
France
USA
Brazil
Mexico
South Africa
Russia
Romania
Greece
Kazakhstan
Ukraina Uzbekistan
Lithuania
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
50
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.08
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Transparency International (2002)
OECD: Economic Equality vs. Corruption
Figure 9
Mexico
Turkey USA
Denmark
United Kingdom
South Korea
Italy
Portugal
Hungary
Slovakia
France
Germany
Austria Sweden
Spain
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.01
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Transparency International (2002)
Non-OECD: Economic Equality vs. Corruption
Figure 10
Singapore
Chile
Israel
Malta
Slovenia
Estonia
Uruguay
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Colombia
El Salvador
Kenya
MauritiusChina
Ethiopia
Turkmenistan
Bangladesh
Guinea
Nigeria
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
50
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.21
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
OECD: Economic Equality vs. Rule of Law
Figure 11
Mexico
Turkey USA
Denmark
Portugal
Spain
South Korea
Poland
Slovakia
Hungary
France
Germany
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Sweden
HighLow
High 
Equality
Low
Equality
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.04
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
Non-OECD: Economic Equality vs. Rule of Law
Figure 12
Zimbabwe
Somalia
Chile
Singapore
Malta
Slovenia
Taiwan
Uruguay
JamaicaKenya
Thailand
India
Uganda
El Salvador
Nigeria
Guinea
Bangladesh
Turkmenistan
Croatia
Mongolia
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
50
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.17
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
OECD: Economic Equality vs. Government Effectiveness
Figure 13
USA
Mexico
Turkey
Portugal
Poland
Slovakia
Hungary
Japan
Greece
France
Germany
Ireland Canada
Denmark
United Kingdom
Sweden
High 
Equality
Low
Equality
Low High
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.02
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
Non-OECD: Economic Equality vs.
Government Effectiveness
Figure 14
Chile
Singapore
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Malta
Slovenia
Costa Rica
Zimbabwe
Haiti Kenya
Somalia
Iraq
Turkmenistan
Ethiopia
BulgariaEgypt
Iran
Macedonia
China
Thailand
GuyanaUgandaVenezuela
Ecuador
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
50
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-1 0 1 2
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.10
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
OECD: Economic Equality vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 15
Hungary
Czech Republic
Greece
Portugal
Mexico
Turkey
Poland
Spain
Germany
France
Sweden
Netherlands
USA
Denmark
New ZeelandUnited Kingdom
Austria
Finland
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.22
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Non-OECD: Economic Equality
vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 16
South Africa Brazil
Georgia
Estonia
Slovenia
AlbaniaMacedonia
Bosnia & Herz.
Kazakhstan
Russia
Armenia India
Lithuania
Malta
HighLow
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
46
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.03
Sources: UNDP(1995-2003), Transparency International (2002)
OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs. Corruption
Figure 17
Turkey
Mexico
Italy
USA
New Zealand
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Finland
Austria
Hungary
South Korea
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
2 4 6 8 10
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)
R-squared=0.00
Sources: UNDP(1995-2003), Transparency International (2002)
Non-OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs. Corruption
Figure 18
Singapore
Chile
Israel
Slovenia
Estonia
South AfricaBrazil
China
Ecuador
Bolivia
Tunisia
Belarus
Ethiopia
Benin
Bangladesh
Kenya
Mozambique
Moldava
Romania
India
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
46
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.13
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs. Rule of Law
Figure 19
Mexico
Turkey
Slovakia
Poland
Italy
Hungary
Czech Republic
France
USA
United Kingdom
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
Sweden
HighLow
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-2 -1 0 1 2
Rule of Law (World Bank)
R-squared=0.00
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002-2003)
Non-OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs. Rule of Law
Figure 20
Haiti
Bolivia
Paraguay
South Africa
Chile
SingaporeUruguay
Estonia
SloveniaIndia
Armenia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Zimbabwe Papua New Guinea
Phillipines
Mozambique Mauritius
China
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
46
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.11
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs.
Government Effectiveness
Figure 21
Turkey
Mexico 
Poland
Slovakia
Italy
South Korea
Hungary
Czech Republic
Portugal
France
USA
United Kingdom
Canada
Switzerland
Finland
Sweden
Germany
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.00
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), World Bank (2002)
Non-OECD: Income of Poorest 20% vs. Government Effectiveness
Figure 22
Haiti
Turkmenistan
Paraguay
Ecuador Chile
SingaporeUruguay
Estonia
Slovenia
Croatia
China
India
Dominican Republic
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Belarus Indonesia
JordanMozambique
Kazakhstan
Brazil
Iran
Uganda
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
46
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-1 0 1 2
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.06
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
OECD: Income of Poorest 20%
vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 23
Mexico
Turkey
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Greece
Slovakia
Hungary
Czech Republic
Germany
South Korea
USA
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Netherlands
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
Low High
24
6
8
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.00
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Non-OECD: Income of Poorest 20%
vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 24
Estonia
Brazil
South Africa
Russia
Ukraine
Macedonia
Lithuania
Romania
India
Uzbekistan
Bulgaria
Croatia
Low High
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
60
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.15
Sources: UNU-WIDER (2002-2006), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Western Europe: Economic Equality
vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 25
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Germany
France
Belgium
Austria
Sweden
Netherlands
Iceland
Switzerland
Norway
United Kingdom
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
HighLow
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
67
8
9
1
0
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
P
o
o
r
e
s
t
 
2
0
%
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Impartiality Index (QoG)
R-squared=0.37
UNDP (1995-2003), Teorell & QoG Institute (2009)
Western Europe: Income of Poorest 20%
vs. Government Impartiality
Figure 26
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
France
Germany Belgium Austria
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Switzerland
Ireland
Netherlands
United Kingdom
HighLow
Low
Equality
High 
Equality
02
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
B
e
l
o
w
 
2
 
U
S
D
/
D
a
y
 
(
%
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank)
R-squared=0.39
Source: World Bank (1995-2007)
Proportion of Population Below 2 USD/Day (%)
vs. Government Effectiveness
Figure 27
Low High
Low 
Poverty
High 
Poverty
Chile
Tunisia
BhutanChina
Tanzania
India
Vietnam
Congo
Turkmenistan
Ukraine Bulgaria
Morocco
Venezuela
Uzbekistan
Burundi
Moldava
Cameroon
; 112 ”poor” countries
Russia
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
R-squared=0.04
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Freedom House/Marshall & Jaggers (2000-2005)
Economic Equality vs. Democracy
Figure 28
Turkmenistan
Iraq
China
Pakistan Ethiopia
Tunisia
Iran
Zimbabwe
Haiti
Singapore Russia
Kenya
Ukraine
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Chile
USA
India
Croatia
Japan
Slovenia
Sweden
HighLow
Low 
Equality
High 
Equality
Albania
Jamaica
Swaziland
50
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
7
5
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
7 8 9 10
Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
R-squared=0.23
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Freedom House/Marshall & Jaggers (2000-2005)
OECD: Economic Equality vs. Democracy
Figure 29
High 
Equality
Low 
Equality
Low High
Turkey
Mexico
USA
South Korea
Hungary
France
Japan
Poland
Portugal
UK
Germany
Sweden
30
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
r
e
v
e
r
s
e
d
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
R-squared=0.00
Sources: UNU-WIDER (1995-2006), Freedom House/Marshall & Jaggers (2000-2005)
Non-OECD: Economic Equality vs. Democracy
Figure 30
High 
Equality
Low 
Equality
Low High
Turkmenistan
Iraq
Pakistan
Ethiopia
China
Zimbabwe
Haiti
Azerbaijan
Singapore
Iran
Nigeria
Russia
Ukraine
Indonesia
Kenya
Philippines
Bolivia
Argentina Chile
Uruguay
Israel
Albania
Cyprus
Slovenia
Jamaica
Mongolia
Armenia
Tunisia
02
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
B
e
l
o
w
 
2
 
U
S
D
/
D
a
y
 
(
%
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
R-squared=0.19
Sources: World Bank (1995-2007), Freedom House/Marshall & Jaggers (2000-2005)
Proportion of Population Below 2 USD/Day (%)
vs. Democracy
Figure 31
High 
Poverty
Low 
Poverty
Low High
Turkmenistan
Egypt
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Pakistan
Liberia
Ethiopia
Cambodia
Tanzania
Comoros
Ghana
India
Papua New Guinea
Mauritania Djibouti
Iran Russia
Colombia Peru
Chile
Mongolia
Madagascar
Gabon
Gambia
Nigeria
Timor-Leste
Turkey
Jamaica
Panama
